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The paper discusses objections against non-hidden variable versions of the epistemic
conception of quantum states—the view that quantum states do not describe the
properties of quantum systems but reflect, in some way to be specified, the epi-
stemic conditions of agents assigning them. In the first half of the paper, the main
motivation for the epistemic conception of quantum states is sketched, and a version
of it is outlined, which combines ideas from an earlier study of it [Friederich 2011]
with elements of Richard Healey’s recent pragmatist interpretation of quantum the-
ory [Healey forthcoming a]. In the second half, various objections against epistemic
accounts of quantum states are discussed in detail, which are based on criticisms
found in the literature. Possible answers by the version outlined here are compared
with answers from the quantum Bayesian point of view, which is at present the
most discussed version of the epistemic conception of quantum states.
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1 Introduction
The measurement problem and the problem of quantum “non-locality”, that is, the
claimed tension between quantum theory and relativity theory, are widely regarded
as the most outstanding difficulties in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Pos-
sible ways to react to these problems (or “paradoxes”) range from changing the
dynamics (as in GRW theory) to adding determinate particle and field configura-
tions (as in pilot wave approaches) to adopting a non-standard picture of our world
according to which our universe (or our minds) constantly splits into an immense
number of branches (as in variants of the Everett interpretation). These are at-
tempts to solve the paradoxes, either by altering the formalism of the theory or by
radically altering our picture of the world so that at least one of the assumptions
necessary to derive the paradoxes no longer holds.
The present paper investigates accounts of quantum theory which approach
the paradoxes from an entirely different perspective. Their main ambition is to
dissolve the paradoxes by proposing a perspective on the linguistic roles of the
constituents of the quantum theoretical formalism according to which at least one
of the assumptions necessary to derive the paradoxes counts not as wrong (in which
case one might speak of a solution rather than a dissolution) but as conceptually ill-
formed. The motivation underlying these approaches is “therapeutic” inasmuch as
they aim at “curing” us from what they see as unfounded worries about foundational
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issues based on conceptual misunderstandings. More specifically, the accounts to be
discussed are grounded in the hope that a non-ontic reading of quantum states—a
reading which construes quantum states as having a non-descriptive linguistic role,
which differs from that of representing reality—may hold the key to conceive of the
theory in such a way that the paradoxes do not arise in the first place.
The defining characteristic of non-ontic readings of quantum states is that they
do reject the notion of a true quantum state of a quantum system—a quantum state
it is in.1 Non-ontic readings of quantum states mostly embrace some version of
the epistemic conception of states—the view that quantum states somehow reflect
the state-assigning agents’ epistemic relations to the systems states are assigned
to2—and the present paper focuses on these. A defining criterion of what counts
as a version of the epistemic conception of states is to allow that agents which
are differently situated with respect to one and the same quantum system and
have different epistemic relations to it may (and perhaps even should) legitimately
assign different quantum states to it. As formulated by Rudolf Peierls, one of its
key proponents, the quantum states assigned to the same system by different agents
“may differ as the nature and amount of knowledge may differ.”3
Accounts that are based on the epistemic conception of states must be non-ontic
in that they cannot acknowledge any such thing as an agent-independent “true”
quantum state of a quantum system—a state it “is in”—, for if such a state exists,
assigning precisely that state is the one and only correct way of assigning a quantum
state and assigning any other state would be wrong. Any account that accepts the
notion of a “quantum state a quantum system is in”, without construing it as a
sometimes harmless yet potentially misleading fac¸on de parler, does not qualify as
an epistemic account of quantum states in the sense of the present paper.
Just like any other take on the foundations of quantum theory, the epistemic
conception of states has been heavily criticised on a number of different grounds.
The main aim of the present paper is to consider the most important objections
brought forward against it together with possible rejoinders. Most of the objec-
tions considered were originally raised as criticisms of quantum Bayesianism, a
remarkably radical epistemic account of quantum states the core idea of which is to
1According to the terminological conventions employed in this paper, an account of
quantum states qualifies as “non-ontic” if and only if it denies that for every quantum
system there exists exactly one (true) quantum state it is in. Accounts which accept this
assumption are referred to as “ontic”. Thus, accounts need not attribute any metaphys-
ically ambitious kinds of reality to quantum states (as some versions of pilot wave theory
may not) in order to count as ontic in the sense used here.
2There are versions of the epistemic conception of states which add additional (ontic)
variable configurations to the standard formalism of quantum theory. Important contri-
butions to this type of approach include the construction of an explicit toy model based
on the epistemic conception of quantum states by Spekkens (see [Spekkens 2007]), which
reproduces many signature qualitative features of quantum theory. More recently, a the-
orem due to Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (see [Pusey et al. 2011]) has stimulated a lot of
interest and research activity, which establishes that an important class of hidden-variable
models based on the epistemic conception yields predictions which are compatible with
those of standard quantum theory. Hidden-variable models combined with epistemic ac-
counts of quantum states do not conform to the therapeutic ambitions outlined before and
are therefore not further discussed in what follows, but their investigation represents no
doubt an intriguing and flourishing field of research.
3See [Peierls 1991] p. 19.
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interpret quantum probabilities as subjective degrees of belief in accordance with
the subjective Bayesian account of probability. One of the goals of the present paper
is to explore quantum Bayesianism’s resources for answering these objections.
In addition to quantum Bayesianism, the paper expounds and develops another
version of the epistemic conception of quantum states, introduced in the following
sections as the “Rule Perspective” (for reasons to be given), which is based on a
combination of ideas developed in an earlier study of the epistemic conception of
states (see [Friederich 2011]) with elements drawn from Richard Healey’s recent
pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory (see [Healey forthcoming a]).4 The
main result of the discussion of objections in later sections of this paper is that the
“Rule Perspective” (omitting the scare quotes from now on) fares much better in
answering them than quantum Bayesianism. This does not mean, of course, that the
Rule Perspective is superior to all other rival interpretive takes on quantum theory
or that it even constitutes the uniquely correct account of quantum foundations. Far
from making such ambitious claims, my more modest aim in this paper is to argue
that the idea of dissolving the paradoxes without introducing any hidden variables,
additional dynamics and without accepting Everettian branching can be formulated
and defended in a coherent way. Arguably, this suffices to make accounts that are
based on it into serious contenders among interpretations of quantum theory.
The structure of the remaining sections of this paper is as follows: Section 2
sketches in which way the epistemic conception of quantum states dissolves the
notorious paradoxes of measurement and non-locality by undermining their formu-
lations. Section 3 reviews quantum Bayesianism and introduces the reader to the
Rule Perspective. Sections 4, 5, and 6 are the core sections of the paper. They
consider objections against the epistemic conception of quantum states (found in
the literature or inspired by it) and develop and discuss possible answers from the
points of view of quantum Bayesianism and the Rule Perspective. The paper closes
in Section 7 with some remarks on the shared ambition of the Rule Perspective and
the Everett Interpretation to understand quantum theory without supplementing
its standard formalism in any way.
2 Dissolving the paradoxes
The present section gives an outline of how the epistemic conception of quantum
states dissolves the measurement problem and the problem of quantum “non-
locality”, that is, the claimed tension between quantum theory and relativity theory.
I consider the measurement problem first.
4For studies elaborating on the epistemic conception of states and views in
a similar spirit see [Fuchs and Peres 2000], [Mermin 2003], [Caves et al. 2002a],
[Caves et al. 2002b], [Fuchs 2002], [Pitowsky 2003], [Appleby 2005], [Bub 2007],
[Caves et al. 2007], [Fuchs and Schack 2009], [Bub and Pitowsky 2010], [Barnum 2010],
[Fuchs and Schack 2011], [Friederich 2011].
Healey’s pragmatist interpretation is closely related to epistemic accounts of quantum
states in many respects, but Healey himself does not regard his own view as a version of the
epistemic conception (see [Healey forthcoming a] p. 16). The similarity in spirit becomes
clear, for instance, in Healey’s take on measurement collapse “as a way of updating [an
agent’s] authoritative source of advice”, in complete agreement with how the epistemic
conception of quantum states views collapse, as discussed in Section 2.1.
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2.1 The measurement problem
There exist various different formulations of the measurement problem in the lit-
erature, which are sometimes even conceived as different measurement problems.5
Here I focus on an exposition due to [Maudlin 1995] (who alone gives three dif-
ferent formulations), to illustrate how the epistemic conception of quantum states
dissolves it. In Maudlin’s formulation, the problem arises from the incompatibility
of the following three assumptions:
1.A The wave-function of a system is complete, i. e. the wave-function
specifies (directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a sys-
tem.
1.B The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynam-
ical equation (e. g. the Schro¨dinger equation).
1.C Measurements of, e. g., the spin of an electron always (or at least
usually) have determinate outcomes, i. e., at the end of the measure-
ment the measuring device is either in a state which indicates spin up
(and not down) or spin down (and not up). (See [Maudlin 1995] p. 7.)
To see that these assumptions are incompatible (though not strictly logically in-
consistent, see [Maudlin 1995] p. 10), one has to consider a situation in which the
system being measured is not in an eigenstate of the measured observable. In that
case, according to 1.B, the state of the combined system consisting of the measured
system together with the measuring apparatus evolves into a superposition of eigen-
states of the measured and the “pointer” observable, whose different possible values
correspond to macroscopically different configurations of the “pointer” (or display)
of the apparatus. This state doesn’t single out or prefer by itself any of the possible
values of the measured observable of the measured system nor of the pointer ob-
servable pertaining to the apparatus. Nevertheless, according to 1.A, it provides a
complete description of the combined system, including both the measured system
and the apparatus. On the basis of this assumption we have to conclude that none of
the possible values of the measured and the pointer observables is actually realised
(or all at once, as Everettians conclude). Assumption 1.C, however, requires that at
the end of the measurement process the value of the pointer observable is determ-
inate. Consequently, the three assumptions, taken together, are incompatible and
at least one of them has to be dropped. A necessary condition for an interpretation
of quantum theory to count as a candidate solution to the measurement problem
is that it declares either 1.A or 1.B or 1.C to be wrong (or that it finds a loophole
in the reasoning leading to their claimed incompatibility, as seems very difficult).
Solutions to the measurement problem contrast with dissolutions. Dissolutions re-
ject at least one of the assumptions 1.A, 1.B or 1.C as well—but for being senseless
rather than for being wrong or, to put it more diplomatically, for being based on
mistaken conceptual presuppositions rather than for being mistaken.
Accounts that are based on the epistemic conception of states dissolve the
measurement problem in precisely that sense. They do not acknowledge the no-
tion of a quantum state a quantum system “is in” and reject the view that it is
part of the linguistic role of quantum states to specify “physical properties of a
system” (Maudlin’s assumption 1.A) in the first place. Whereas solutions to the
5See [Wallace 2008] for a detailed “modern” take on the measurement problem and an
overview of proposed solutions.
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measurement problem which reject assumption 1.A as wrong hold that quantum
states are incomplete specifications of the physical properties of quantum systems
(pilot wave approaches are examples of such views, inasmuch as according to them
the quantum state specifies some features of physical reality, but not all), the epi-
stemic conception of states denies that quantum states are appropriately construed
as specifications of physical properties in the first place. Assumption 1.C (outcome
determinateness) is left untouched, and the ramifications for assumption 1.B are
essentially the same as for 1.A since the notion of “the wave-function” of a system
is rejected as referring to a special case of that of a quantum state a quantum
system is in. Agents who are competent in applying quantum theory do of course
assign quantum states to quantum systems and they make them undergo unitary
time-evolution according to the Schro¨dinger equation, but acknowledging this is
very different from endorsing an interpretation of unitary time-evolution as corres-
ponding to the evolution of physical properties of the system itself.
In applications of quantum theory the measurement problem does not arise
as a practical difficulty, as it is circumvented by what is widely seen as an act of
brute force: invocation of the notorious von Neumann measurement collapse of the
wave-function. From the perspective of ontic accounts of quantum states collapse
is disconcerting in that it remains completely dubious and unclear under which
conditions it occurs. From the perspective of the epistemic conception of states, in
contrast, measurement collapse merely reflects a sudden and discontinuous change
in the epistemic situation of the state-assigning agent, not a discontinuity in the
time-evolution of the system itself, so the question of under which conditions it
occurs becomes meaningless. A question that does make sense from the point
of view of the epistemic conception of quantum states is under which conditions
an agent assigning a quantum state should apply the collapse postulate. This
question will be discussed in more detail in connection with the Rule Perspective
in Section 3.2. Objections against the employment of “anthropocentric notions”
(such as “measurement”, “information”, “apparatus”), as it occurs in the epistemic
conception of quantum states and its take on collapse, are discussed in Section 5.
The epistemic conception of states undermines the measurement problem in the
form just discussed and offers an elegant justification of the otherwise mysterious
collapse, but it does not guarantee by itself that the problem will not arise at a
different stage in a different form. One objection critics are likely to raise, for
instance, is that rejecting conceptual presuppositions of the measurement problem
hardly suffices to account for why measurements have determinate outcomes in the
first place. No-go theorems on assigning determinate values to observables (the
Kochen-Specker theorem and its relatives in particular) make it unattractive to
assume that observables do have determinate values at all times, so the question
arises as to why observables which we measure never fail to exhibit determinate
values at the end of a measurement process. Even though the epistemic conception
of states dissolves the measurement problem in the sense of a sharp antinomy
of conflicting assumptions, it does not by itself account for why measurements
processes always result in determinate values of the observables measured. Different
epistemic accounts of quantum states respond differently to this latter challenge,
however, and I postpone the discussion of possible answers by the epistemic accounts
of quantum states considered here to a later stage (see Section 5.2).
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2.2 The problem of “non-locality”
The problem of whether quantum theory is compatible with the principles of re-
lativity theory arises perhaps most blatantly in the challenge of reconciling the
time-evolution of quantum states including collapse in whatever suitable form with
the requirement of Lorentz invariance as inferred from relativity theory. To see
this problem in an example, consider a two-particle system in an EPR-Bohm setup
where two spin-1/2 systems A and B are prepared in such a way that those know-
ing about the preparation procedure assign an entangled state, for instance, the
state 12 (|+〉A|−〉B−|−〉A|+〉B) for their combined spin degrees of freedom. Assume
further that the two systems A and B have been brought far apart and an agent
Alice, located at the first system A, measures its spin in a certain direction. Having
registered the result and having applied the projection postulate, she assigns two no
longer entangled states to A and B, which depend on the choice of observable meas-
ured and on the measured result. Another agent, Bob, located at the second system
B, may also perform a spin measurement (in the same or in a different direction of
spin) and proceed to assign a pair of no longer entangled states to the two systems
in an analogous way. Now the intriguing challenge concerning the compatibility of
quantum theory and relativity theory is to specify at which time which system is
in which state and to do so in a Lorentz invariant manner. The difficulty is most
blatant for cases where the measurements carried out by Alice and Bob occur in
spacelike separated regions, perhaps even in such a way that each of them precedes
the other in its own rest frame (see [Zbinden et al. 2001]). In that case there is
clearly no non-arbitrary answer to the question as to which measurement occurs
first and triggers the abrupt change of state of the other. There exist attempts
of overcoming this problem without completely abandoning either collapse or the
notion of a state a quantum system is in by making the time-evolution of quantum
states dependent on foliations of space-time into sets of parallel hyperplanes, but
there does not seem to be general agreement as to whether this programme suc-
ceeds, and the approach remains controversial.6
The epistemic conception of quantum states undermines the conceptual pre-
suppositions of the reasoning leading to this problem by rejecting the notion of
a quantum state a quantum system is in and by interpreting the assignment of
different states to the two systems by the different agents as at once legitimate
and very natural: Alice knows about the preparation procedure for the combined
two-particle system, and when she registers the result pertaining to her own sys-
tem this affects her epistemic condition with respect to the second. The state she
assigns to it reflects her epistemic relation to it, and there is no need to assume
that her measurement of her own system physically influences the second. The
same considerations apply for Bob. Predictions for the results of measurements
derived on the basis of entangled states may still be baffling and unexpected, but
the dynamics of quantum states do not give rise to any incompatibility between
the principles of relativity theory and those of quantum theory as construed by the
epistemic conception of states. The paradox of quantum non-locality (inasmuch as
6See [Fleming 1989] for a hyperplane-dependent formulation of state reduction
and [Myrvold 2002] for a more recent defence of that approach. For criticism see
[Maudlin 2011], which, based on the presupposition that the ontic conception of states
is correct, comes to a very negative verdict on whether relativity theory and quantum
theory in its present form can be consistently combined at all.
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it resides in the challenge of reconciling the time-evolution of quantum states with
the principles of relativity theory) is dissolved by rejecting its conceptual presup-
position, namely, the ontic conception of states and the interpretation of quantum
theoretical time-evolution as a physical process.
In analogy to the case of the measurement problem, the dissolution of the prob-
lem of “non-locality” just outlined is no demonstration that there are no further
problems linked to reconciling quantum theory with relativity theory. Several au-
thors claim that there are some serious further problems, for instance by arguing
that quantum theory violates a principle of local causality7 and that this violation
can only be accounted for by assuming superluminal causation. However, a shared
presupposition of all theories to which such principles of local causality apply is
to conceive of quantum probabilities as non-relative, agent-independent objective
quantities. The epistemic conception of quantum states rejects this presupposition,
which is closely related to the view that for any quantum system there exists one
true quantum state it is in (for more details on the relation between the two views
see Section 3), so according to this view quantum theory neither exhibits nor viol-
ates local causality in the specified sense. Another argumentative strategy found in
the literature to establish that there exists a severe tension between quantum theory
and relativity theory is to argue that quantum theoretical “non-local” correlations
ground certain counterfactual claims which, it is claimed, can only obtain in the
presence of superluminal causation.8 Such arguments do not necessarily presup-
pose any specific view of quantum states, and, inasmuch as they don’t, other moves
are required to address them than adopting a non-ontic (or epistemic) account of
quantum states. The most promising strategies seem to be either to question that
quantum theory really licences the counterfactual claims at issue or to deny that
they are really claims about causal connections.9 Fortunately, it is largely irrel-
evant for the purposes of the present paper whether or not such counterfactuals
deserve to be called “causal” as long as no incompatibility between quantum the-
ory and the principles of relativity theory arises in a more straightforward sense
(as most blatantly for the dynamics of collapse in the scenario investigated by
[Zbinden et al. 2001] mentioned above). The epistemic conception of states may
not completely dispel the felt tension between some aspects of quantum theory and
relativity theory, but it arguably removes any clear-cut inconsistency between the
two.
7See [Bell 1990] for an account of why quantum theory violates local causality and
[Seevinck and Uffink 2011] for a recent extension and sharpening of Bell’s claims and res-
ults. See [Healey forthcoming c] for a detailed defence of the claim that “non-local” cor-
relations obtained from quantum theory are not in any conflict with relativity theory.
The rather sketchy remarks on this issue found in the main text of the present paper
are strongly based on Healey’s considerations. This holds, in particular, for the obser-
vation that the proposed principles of local causality apply to quantum theory only if
certain interpretive assumptions are made which conflict both with Healey’s pragmatist
interpretation and the epistemic accounts of quantum states discussed here.
8See, for instance, [Butterfield 1992] and Chapter 5 of [Maudlin 2011] for such argu-
ments.
9See [Healey forthcoming c], Section 7, for a detailed defence of the view that the
connections between events which are stated in counterfactuals involving “non-local” cor-
relations are not causal.
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3 Two epistemic accounts of quantum states
Various different epistemic accounts of quantum states have been proposed, and
it is not my aim to provide a systematic overview of them here. Rather, I shall
focus on only two (very different) epistemic accounts of quantum states and dis-
cuss their respective problems and advantages in more detail. The first account
is quantum Bayesianism, a position developed by C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs and
R. Schack, supported in some of its central tenets by H. N. Barnum, M. D. Ap-
pleby (and perhaps other authors).10 Its core idea is to interpret quantum prob-
abilities as subjective degrees of belief in accordance with the subjective Bayesian
take on probability. An exposition of the central claims and results of quantum
Bayesianism is given in Section 3.1. The second account to be discussed, the Rule
Perspective, combines ideas developed in [Friederich 2011] with ideas drawn from
Richard Healey’s recently proposed pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory
(see [Healey forthcoming a]). Section 3.2.1 introduces it as an account of the rules
governing the assignment of quantum states as constitutive rules in the sense of
[Searle 1969]. Section 3.2.2 extends it to an account of quantum probabilities and
the Born Rule.
3.1 Quantum Bayesianism
The central idea of quantum Bayesianism is that quantum probabilities, as encoded
in quantum states via the Born Rule, are subjective probabilities in the subjective
Bayesian sense. As such, they are construed as reflecting the state assigning agents’
subjective degrees of belief as to what the results of their future “interventions into
nature”11 might be. Degrees of belief may legitimately differ from agent to agent
without any of them behaving irrationally or making any kind of mistake. So,
from the quantum Bayesian point of view different agents may indeed legitimately
assign different quantum states to the same system, no notion of a quantum state
as a state some quantum system “is in” is employed, and the position qualifies
as a potentially consistent epistemic account of quantum states. According to
Fuchs, “quantum states do not exist”12 in that they are not part of the furniture
of the world, they do not correspond to any physical facts or properties of physical
system but, instead, represent the assigning agents’ degrees of belief as to what the
consequences of their actions on the systems the states are assigned to might be.
Quantum Bayesianism, as originally conceived, is not merely a novel philo-
sophical perspective on quantum theory but also an ambitious programme of re-
formulating the theory from the start in terms of probabilistic and information-
theoretic notions rather than abstract mathematical ones such as Hilbert spaces
and complex probability amplitudes. Such an information-theoretic re-formulation,
it is hoped, might help us understand which elements of quantum theory repres-
ent physical features of the world and which others merely flow from what counts
as rational reasoning of the agents applying the theory. The strategy Fuchs an-
10See [Caves et al. 2002a], [Caves et al. 2002b], [Fuchs 2002], [Appleby 2005],
[Caves et al. 2007],[Fuchs and Schack 2009], [Fuchs and Schack 2011], [Barnum 2010] for
contributions and (essentially) approving comments to the quantum Bayesian programme
and [Timpson 2008] for a highly useful review and critique.
11See [Fuchs 2002] p. 7.
12Thus the title of section II of [Fuchs 2010].
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nounces for his programme is this: “Weed out all the terms that have to do with
gambling commitments, information, knowledge, and belief, and what is left be-
hind will play the role of Einstein’s [space-time] manifold”, namely, as he explains,
“a mathematical object, the study of which one can hope will tell us something
about nature itself, not merely about the observer in nature.”13 In what follows
I shall not be concerned with the prospects and problems of this re-formulation
programme for quantum theory, even though it certainly merits the attention it
gets, but rather focus on the assumptions about the status of quantum observables,
states and probabilities on which it is based.
One of the greatest achievements of quantum Bayesianism is its response to
the challenge of not being able to make sense of talk about “unknown quantum
states” (which has a prominent role, for instance, in quantum state tomography),
even though, from the quantum Bayesian point of view, the notion of an “un-
known quantum state” makes no sense. The result on which quantum Bayesians
ground their response is the so-called quantum de Finetti theorem, which makes
it understandable why different agents who register the same measured data gen-
erally come to agreement in their assignment of quantum states in the long run,
even if the states they start out with are very different. The main presupposition
used is that the agents (subjectively) judge the states of the sequence of measured
systems to be exchangeable, roughly meaning that for all agents both the order
of measured events and the number of measurements witnessed are irrelevant. As
demonstrated by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, this suffices to guarantee that “the
updated probability P (ρ|DK) becomes highly peaked on a particular state ρDK
dictated by the measurement results, regardless of the prior probability P (ρ), as
long as P (ρ) is nonzero in a neighbourhood of ρDK”
14 This result can be used to
account for the fact that the states assigned by different agents will converge after
a sufficiently large number of measurements witnessed without postulating that
there is any such thing as the agent-independent unknown true quantum state the
states assigned by the different agents converge to. As this shows, taking seriously
quantum theoretical practice inasmuch as it involves talk about “unknown quantum
states” does not mean that one has to embrace an ontic account of quantum states,
in which such talk is interpreted literally.
In order to be consistent as fully-fledged subjective Bayesian interpretation of
quantum probabilities, quantum Bayesianism goes very far in interpreting elements
of the quantum mechanical formalism as subjective. The view is particularly radical
in its rejection of the innocently looking assumption that there can be an objective
matter as to which observable some numerical value obtained in an experiment
is a value of. To put it differently, quantum Bayesianism rejects the idea that
the question of which observable is measured in which experimental setup ever
has a determinate answer. In Fuchs’ own wording the main motivation for this
astonishing claim is the following:
Take, as an example, a device that supposedly performs a standard
von Neumann measurement {Πd}, the measurement of which is ac-
companied by the standard collapse postulate. Then when a click d is
found, the posterior quantum state will be ρd = Πd regardless of the
initial state ρ. If this state-change rule is an objective feature of the
13See [Fuchs 2002] p. 6.
14See [Caves et al. 2002b] p. 4541.
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device or its interaction with the system—i. e., it has nothing to do
with the observer’s subjective judgement—then the final state must
be an objective feature of the quantum system. ([Fuchs 2002] p. 39)
According to this line of thought, if we suppose that the question of which observ-
able some value obtained in an experiment is a value of has a determinate answer,
applying the projection postulate to the state assigned to the system prior to meas-
urement results in a uniquely determined post-measurement state, depending only
on the observable measured and the measured result, not on the state assigned pre-
viously. But this means that assigning any other state than the one obtained from
application of the projection postulate would be wrong. At least with respect to
those cases where the post-measurement state has no dependence at all on the pre-
measurement state (as in projective measurement of a non-degenerate observable),
it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that this must be the true quantum state of
the system—the one it is in—, yet this conclusion is incompatible with a non-ontic
reading of quantum states, according to which quantum states are in general not
states quantum systems are in. Even in those cases where the post-measurement
state has a residual dependence on the pre-measurement state, application of the
projection postulate imposes strong constraints on the post-measurement state if
one assumes that which observable has been measured and which value has been
obtained are objective matters. Since such constraints severely restrict admissible
state assignments, quantum Bayesians, for the sake of consistency of their subject-
ive Bayesian take on probability, feel forced to deny that there can be an objective
answer to the question of which observable some measured value is a value of.15
This conclusion, however, is extremely difficult to swallow. If there could be
no fact of the matter as to which observable some measured value is a value of
according to all versions of the epistemic conception of quantum states, one could
well regard this result as a reductio of the epistemic conception of states itself. The
main problems with this conclusion are, first, that in quantum theoretical practice
there is virtually always agreement on which observable some value measured in
some setup is a value of, and it seems difficult to imagine how quantum theory
could be as empirically successful as it is if this were not the case. Second, if there
were no fact of the matter as to which observable some measured value is a value
of, there could never be any knowledge of the values of observables, at least not
knowledge obtained in experiment. It seems clear, however, that physicists often
do have knowledge of the values of at least some observables, and this makes the
idea that there is no determinate answer to the question of which observable is
measured in which setup even more problematic.16 The account presented in the
following subsection of this paper can be seen as an attempt to improve on quantum
15An alternative move with the same consequences would be to accept that the ques-
tion of which observable some measured value is a value of has a determinate answer while
denying that which mathematical object (which linear operator, say) represents that ob-
servable is an objective matter, even after a Hilbert space representation of the canonical
commutation relations has already been chosen and other observables have already been
associated with linear operators. Since this option is for all dialectical purposes equivalent
to the one discussed in the text I shall not consider it any more in what follows as a
possible option for the quantum Bayesian.
16See [Friederich 2011], Section 3, for a more detailed version of this argument against
the quantum Bayesian claim that there can be no fact of the matter as to which observable
some value obtained in experiment is a value of.
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Bayesianism in precisely these respects.
3.2 The Rule Perspective
3.2.1 Quantum state assignment
As I have argued, quantum Bayesianism’s denial of the assumption that there can
be any fact of the matter as to which observable some numerical value obtained
in an experiment is a value of leads to serious problems. It seems therefore worth
investigating whether one really needs to deny this assumption for consistency in
epistemic accounts of quantum states. In what follows I shall give a brief argument
that this is not the case. In particular, as I shall argue, abandoning the notion of a
quantum state that a quantum system is in does not necessarily entail abandoning
the notion of a quantum state assignment being performed correctly.
Assuming that there is an objective fact as to which observable some measured
value is a value of, it seems plausible that agents having registered such a value
must update the states they assign in a fixed and determinate way by applying the
projection postulate, taking into account the measured result. However, even with
respect to cases where this narrows down possible post-measurement states to as-
sign to a uniquely determined (pure) quantum state, saying this is not the same as
concluding that this state is the true post-measurement quantum state the system
“is in” after measurement, which characterises the system in an agent-independent
way. Other agents need not have had any chance to register the measured event due
to how they are physically situated (outside the future light cone of the measure-
ment process, say). In this case, if we take seriously the idea that quantum states
should reflect the epistemic situations of the agents assigning them, assigning the
same state as those who have registered the measured result would not only not
be mandatory for those who haven’t registered it, it would even be wrong, for it
would not conform to what they know of the values of observables of the system.
Furthermore, even if one interprets that state as somehow objectively privileged or
distinguished, this does not mean that other (let alone all) quantum systems must
have equally privileged quantum states (to be identified with their “true” ones),
independently of whether there happen to be any agents having knowledge of the
values of their observables. The assumption that even when there are no agents
having knowledge narrowing down possible post-measurement states to a uniquely
determined quantum state, there exists some state which would have to be assigned
by anyone intending to assign correctly need not be made and does not go well
with the epistemic conception of states. To conclude, admitting that there can be
(and in general is) an objective matter as to which observable some measured value
is a value of does not mean that one has to abandon the epistemic conception of
quantum states.17
If one wants to combine an epistemic account of quantum states with the idea
that the observable measured is an objective feature of the measuring device, sense
has to be made of the idea of a state assignment being performed correctly without
thereby acknowledging the notion of a quantum state a quantum system “is in”.
The account proposed in [Friederich 2011] does so by appealing to the rules accord-
17See Section 4 of [Friederich 2011] for a defence of this line of thought against the
anticipated charge that it accords too much weight to the state assignments of agents who
are simply not well-informed about the measured system.
11
ing to which the assignment of quantum states is performed in the application of
quantum theory, arguing that to assign in accordance with them is what it means
to assign correctly. An example of a rule governing state assignment is unitary
time-evolution as prescribed by the Schro¨dinger equation, which in this approach is
regarded not as a fact about quantum states—that their time-evolution follows the
Schro¨dinger equation—but as the rule an agent must apply to the state she assigns
for all times t with respect to which no incoming data concerning the values of
observables are registered. Other examples of such rules include the von Neumann
projection postulate (and its generalisations such as Lu¨ders’ Rule and further gen-
eralisations in terms of POVMs) and the principle of entropy maximisation, which
determines the state that must be assigned by an agent, depending on what she
knows of the values of its observables, if she has not assigned any state before.
From the perspective of this account the rules of state assignment are constitutive
rules18, that is, they are not strategies for obtaining (decent approximations to) the
true quantum states quantum systems are in, but rather define the very notion of
a quantum state assignment being performed correctly. Mastering these rules is a
necessary requirement for being a competent user of quantum theory itself and ap-
plying them correctly is part of correctly applying the theory itself. Consequently,
any justification for these rules—sometimes asked for with respect to the rules of
state change in criticisms of epistemic accounts of quantum states19—comes in the
form of empirical support and confirmation of the theory as a whole. Thus, the
rules are constitutive of what it means to correctly assign a quantum state to a
quantum system as well as partially fixing to the empirical significance of (the ele-
ments of) the formalism of the theory a a whole.20 Due to the eminent role this
account evidently attributes to the rules governing state assignment, I propose to
refer to it, as already announced, as the “Rule Perspective”. The next section dis-
cusses what quantum probabilities should be claimed to be probabilities of in the
Rule Perspective.
3.2.2 Probabilities of what?
A plausible answer to the question of what quantum probabilities are probabilities
of that goes very well with the account of the rules of state assignment just out-
lined has recently been given by Richard Healey in the context of his pragmatist
interpretation of quantum theory [Healey forthcoming a]. A central notion in that
interpretation is that of a non-quantum magnitude claim (“NQMC”, for short),
which refers to statements of the form “The value of observable A of system s lies
in the set of values ∆”. Healey calls such statements “non-quantum”, arguing that
“NQMCs were frequently and correctly made before the development of quantum
theory and continue to be made after its widespread acceptance, which is why I
call them non-quantum.”21 NQMCs essentially seem to be what for adherents of
18The terminology is due to Searle. See [Searle 1969], pp. 33 f., for Searle’s original,
much more detailed account of the notion of a constitutive rule, contrasting it with that
of a regulative rule, which both play an eminent role in Searle’s philosophy of language.
19See, for instance, [Duwell 2011] for objections to Pitowsky’s “objective Bayesian”
approach of justifying the rules of state change by appeal to rational agents’ betting
behaviour in the context of quantum gambles.
20See [Friederich 2011], Section 6, for more details on this point.
21See [Healey forthcoming a] p. 22.
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the Copenhagen interpretation were descriptions in terms of “classical concepts”22,
but Healey objects against calling such statements “classical” that doing so runs
the risk of inviting the misleading impression that a NQMC “carries with it the full
content of classical physics.”23 An endorsement of a NQMC is not to be construed
as entailing any commitment to the view that the dynamics of the system at issue
are described by classical laws of motion. In Healey’s view, taken over in what
follows in the Rule Perspective, NQMCs are crucial in the application of quantum
theory in that they (not quantum states) have the linguistic function of describing
the phenomena and regularities quantum theory is used to predict and explain.
NQMCs are naturally regarded as the bearers of quantum probabilities in the
sense that probabilities are ascribed to them when derived from quantum states via
the Born Rule
probρ(A ∈ ∆) = Tr(ρΠA∆), (1)
where ρ denotes the density operator assigned to the system and ΠA∆ the projection
on the span of eigenvectors of A with eigenvalues lying in ∆. To a first approxima-
tion, at least, we can read this equality as attributing a probability to a statement
of the form “The value of A lies in ∆”, that is, to a NQMC.
The Rule Perspective can adopt this straightforward reading of NQMCs as
what quantum probabilities as probabilities of, but it has to acknowledge the no-go
theorems due to Gleason, Bell, Kochen, Specker and others, which impose severe
constraints on ascribing determinate values to the observables of a quantum sys-
tem. One (or perhaps even “the”) standard response to this difficulty is to interpret
the Born Rule as attributing probabilities to NQMCs only inasmuch as they report
on measurement outcomes. According to this view, the quantity Tr(ρΠA∆) is inter-
preted as the probability of obtaining a value of A lying in ∆, assuming that A
were to be measured. This (heavily instrumentalist) take on the Born Rule has the
unappealing feature that it construes the empirical relevance of quantum theory
as restricted to measurement contexts. In addition, it seems not to do justice to
quantum theoretical practice, where claims about the values of observables are often
considered (and Born Rule probabilities computed for them either explicitly or im-
plicitly) without determining experimentally what these values really are.24 In view
of this observation the challenge of clarifying the appropriate range of applicability
of the Born Rule becomes even more pressing.
Healey’s pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory responds to this challenge
in a way that arguably does justice to quantum theoretical practice. Appealing to
environment-induced decoherence, it holds that an agent is entitled to apply the
Born Rule to just those NQMCs which refer to observables for which taking into
account the system’s interaction with its environment renders the density operator
assigned to the system (at least approximately) diagonal. In the words of Healey:
Born-rule probabilities are well-defined only over claims licensed by
quantum theory. According to the quantum theory, interaction of a
22See, for instance, [Heisenberg 1958] p. 30.
23See [Healey forthcoming a] p. 8.
24See [Healey forthcoming a] pp. 9-16 for a discussion of recent experiments on
environment-induced decoherence involving fullerene molecules that greatly elaborates
and emphasises this point. See [Schlosshauer 2005] for a helpful introduction to decoher-
ence and a clarification of its relevance for the presently most discussed interpretation of
quantum theory.
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system with its environment typically induces decoherence in such a
way as (approximately) to select a preferred basis of states in the sys-
tem’s Hilbert space. Quantum theory will fully license claims about
the real value only of a dynamical variable represented by an operator
that is diagonal in a preferred basis: it will grant a slightly less com-
plete license to claims about approximately diagonal observables. All
these dynamical variables can consistently be assigned simultaneous
real values distributed in accordance with the Born probabilities. So
there is no need to formulate the Born rule so that its probabilities
concern only measurement outcomes. ([Healey forthcoming a] p. 15)
Healey spells out what he means by saying that some NQMC is “licensed” by
quantum theory in terms of an inferentialist account of linguistic meaning that
regards the content of NQMC as determined by what “material inferences”25 an
agent applying quantum theory is entitled to draw from it. In the context of the
present investigation I would like to avoid the specific details of this inferentialist
account and propose a slightly simplified picture according to which we may think
of a NQMC of the form “The value of A lies in ∆” as “licensed” by quantum theory
just in case an agent who applies quantum theory to the system in question is en-
titled to assume as the basis of all her further reasoning that the value of A either
determinately lies within ∆ or outside ∆.26 In accordance with Healey’s claim in
the passage quoted above the Rule Perspective can now say that quantum theory
“licenses” NQMC which refer to an observable A for an agent just in case the (re-
duced) density operator ρ that agent assigns to the system is at least approximately
diagonalised in a preferred way by the spectral decomposition of A.27 The Rule Per-
spective concurs with Healey’s pragmatist interpretation in that it construes Born
Rule probabilities as “well-defined only over claims licensed by quantum theory” in
a given situation in precisely that sense.
Environment-induced decoherence is relevant here in that taking into account
the system’s coupling to its environment and performing the trace over the envir-
onmental degrees of freedom typically makes ρ (at least approximately) diagonal
in an environment-selected basis. In settings functioning as measurement setups,
used to determine the values of observables of some quantum system(s), the role
of the environment is typically played by the system treated as the measurement
apparatus, and the Hilbert space basis selected by decoherence typically coincides
with an eigenbasis of the observable commonly referred to as “measured”. This ac-
counts for the fact that quantum theory, when employed with competence, licenses
25See [Healey forthcoming a] p. 13. Section 3 of that paper spells out Healey’s account
of what it means for a NQMC to be licensed by quantum theory in far more detail.
26To what degree this simplified way of spelling out what it means for a NQMC to be
“licensed” by quantum theory still captures the essence of Healey’s more subtle inferen-
tialist account is something I find difficult to assess. It is not impossible that the Rule
Perspective, as presented here, may need some refinement in this respect, but the present
formulation seems fine enough to allow for a defence of the Rule Perspective against the
various objections discussed in later sections of this paper.
27It seems natural to assume that for degenerate observables an (approximately) block-
diagonal form of the density matrix assigned should suffice for licensing application of
the Born Rule. More detailed empirical investigations as to what is conceived of as a
legitimate application of the Born Rule in quantum theoretical practice would be useful
to say more on this matter.
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application of the Born Rule in measurement contexts and thus yields probabilities
for the possible values of the observable(s) the apparatus is supposed to measure.
As already remarked, Healey argues for his take on the Born Rule on the basis of
an inferentialist theory of conceptual content. Inasmuch as it is simply an accurate
statement of what counts as correct employment of the Born Rule in practice,
however, it is independent of any particular philosophical take on linguistic meaning
and content. Since the main motivation for the Rule Perspective is to dissolve the
paradoxes by paying attention to quantum theoretical practice (where the paradoxes
do not seem to arise as practical difficulties), it is natural to combine it with Healey’s
account of the Born Rule as applying to those NQMCs for which environment-
induced decoherence makes the density matrix assigned (at least approximately)
diagonal. These NQMCs may differ from agent to agent, so not only quantum
probabilities themselves can be different for different agents but also their bearers.
4 Challenging the interpretation of probabilities
4.1 The means/end objection
Quantum Bayesianism construes quantum probabilities as subjective in the sub-
jective Bayesian sense of individual agents’ degrees of belief. Characterising the
status of quantum probabilities in the Rule Perspective in terms of the subject-
ive/objective divide is much less straightforward. On the one hand, they may
be regarded as “subjective” in that view as well, as it is claimed that different
agents (“subjects”) having different epistemic conditions may legitimately ascribe
different probabilities to one and the same NQMC. On the other, they are have an
“objective” status in the Rule Perspective in that for sufficiently specified epistemic
conditions of agents with respect to the values of observables the probabilities to be
ascribed to the NQMCs are completely fixed by the rules governing state assignment
together with the Born Rule. Depending on what aspects of the (philosophically
very rich) notions “subjective” and “objective” one has in mind, quantum prob-
abilities can be seen as either subjective or objective in the Rule Perspective or
both.
Interpretations of quantum probabilities as subjective have been criticised on a
number of grounds. Since quantum Bayesianism conceives of quantum probabilities
as fully subjective and the Rule Perspective does so as well in at least one important
respect (as just sketched), I consider in what follows two especially pointed (closely
related) criticisms of such accounts, which were originally formulated by Chris
Timpson as objections to the quantum Bayesian take on quantum probabilities as
subjective degrees of belief. My conclusion will be that despite the important points
of agreement between the two positions, the objections apply only to quantum
Bayesianism.
The objection I consider first is one that Timpson refers to as the means/ends
objection. Its underlying idea is that any account which denies quantum probabilit-
ies the status of objective features of the world inevitably must make it mysterious
how the theory helps us achieve even the modest goal of “the pragmatic business
of coping with the world”—let alone the more ambitious goal of “finding out how
the world is.”28 According to Timpson, interpreting quantum probabilities not as
28See [Timpson 2008] p. 606.
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objective single case probabilities makes it unclear why updating our assignments
of probabilities in the light of new data should be useful and enhance our predictive
success: “[I]f gathering data does not help us track the extent to which circum-
stances favour some event over another one (this is the denial of objective single
case probability), then why does gathering data and updating our subjective prob-
abilities help us do better in coping with the world?”29 What makes Timpson’s
worries most pressing for quantum Bayesianism is that, for the quantum Bayesian,
in which way an agent should update her probability assignments in the light of
new data is a matter of mere subjective preference alone. The reason for this is
that according to her position there is no fact of the matter as to which observable
has been measured and what kind of update the data prescribe. On this view, the
predictive and pragmatic success of quantum theory—why it helps us “coping with
the world”—is mysterious: If there is no objective answer as to how some assign-
ment of probabilities should be updated in the light of new evidence, it becomes a
miracle that updating probabilities as we do is of use. Thus we see that the main
force of the means/ends objection to quantum Bayesianism, as we see, derives from
that position’s denial of the assumption that we can ever know what observable
some measured value is a value of.
Timpson outlines a possible quantum Bayesian reply to this challenge “of
broadly Darwinian stripe”. According to this reply, “[w]e just do look at data
and we just do update our probabilities in light of it; and it is just a brute fact that
those who do so do better in the world; and those who do not, do not.”30 This re-
sponse, however, as he argues, is ultimately unsatisfying in that it does not address
the original worry, namely, “why do those who observe and update do better[.]”31
Given that according to quantum Bayesianism no way of updating in the light of
incoming data counts as correct (in contrast to all others), this challenge is really
serious.
However, this difficulty applies specifically to quantum Bayesianism, it is not
generic in epistemic accounts of quantum states. The Rule Perspective, for instance,
avoids it. To see this, recall that according to the Rule Perspective quantum the-
ory helps us determine and predict which non-quantum claims (NQMCs) are true.
So, on this view the theory is not only a tool that helps us with the “business of
coping with the world” but also with the more ambitious one of “finding out how
the world is”, as Timpson calls it. In contrast with quantum Bayesianism, the Rule
Perspective concedes that we often do have knowledge of the values of observables,
and it regards the practice of making probability ascriptions and updating them
in the light of new evidence as directed at the aim of improving that knowledge in
various (direct and indirect) ways. Furthermore, it insists that in any sufficiently
specified epistemic situation, there exists an objective fact of the matter as to how,
according to the theory, the updating of probabilities must be made in the light
of new evidence. There remains no “explanatory gap”32, as Timpson objects to
quantum Bayesianism, between the methods of enquiry—assigning quantum states
and deriving probabilities from them—and the goals it seeks to achieve—broadly
(and somewhat crudely) speaking, to determine true NQMCs. Furthermore, since
knowledge about “how the world is” enhances our abilities in “the pragmatic busi-
29Ibid. p. 606.
30Ibid. p. 606.
31Ibid. p. 606.
32Ibid. p. 606.
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ness of coping with the world”, it is small wonder that quantum theory helps us
with the latter if it helps us with the first.
4.2 The quantum Bayesian Moore’s paradox
The second of Timpson’s criticisms against the interpretation of quantum probab-
ilities as subjective focuses on assignments of probability 1. According to Timpson,
if one conceives of quantum probabilities as subjective degrees of belief (as defin-
able, for instance, in terms of the agents’ betting behaviour), this commits one to
the systematic endorsement of pragmatically problematic sentences of the form of
a “quantum Bayesian Moore’s paradox”. Sentences of this type are cousins of the
better known “Moore’s paradox” sentences, invented by G. E. Moore, which are
characterised by having the form
p, but I don’t believe that p.
There is a long-standing philosophical debate on the status and proper interpret-
ation of these sentences, in particular as to whether they involve a pragmatic or
even a semantic contradiction, but there seems to be agreement on their paradox-
ical nature, as Timpson claims, inasmuch as they “violate the rules for the speech
act of sincere assertion.”33 Timpson argues that by interpreting quantum probab-
ilities as subjective degrees of belief and by denying that there is such a thing as
the quantum state a quantum system is in, quantum Bayesianism is committed to
the systematic endorsement of sentences having a similar structure and a similar
kind of paradoxical flavour. The problem he diagnoses arises in connection with
the assignment of quantum states ascribing probability 1 to one possible value of
an observable. Typical examples of practical importance include the assignments
of pure quantum states, which ascribe only probabilities 0 or 1 to the possible val-
ues of observables they are eigenstates of. The problem arises from considering an
agent who consciously accepts the quantum Bayesian take on quantum probabilities
as subjective degrees of belief and assigns a pure quantum state to a system, for
instance the state | ↑z〉 for the spin degree of freedom of a spin-1/2 system. Such
an agent, according to Timpson, “must be happy to assert sentences like: ‘I assign
a pure state (e. g. | ↑z〉) to this system, but there is no fact about what the state
of this system is.’ ”34 In other words, any quantum Bayesian agent is committed
to the systematic endorsement of sentences of the form:
“QBMP: ‘I am certain that p (that the outcome will be spin-up in
the z-direction) but it is not certain that p.’ ” ([Timpson 2008] p.
604. The acronym “QBMP” stands for “quantum Bayesian Moore’s
paradox”.)35
For a quantum Bayesian, an ascription of probability 1 to the value of an observable
signals complete certainty as to what the outcome of measurement of that observ-
33See [Timpson 2008] p. 602.
34Ibid. p. 604.
35The analogy to Moore’s original sentence “p, but I don’t believe that p” can be
made more transparent if the part of the QBMP which reports on the agent’s epistemic
conditions is put second, just as in Moore’s original sentence. (I would like to thank Jeremy
Butterfield for pointing this out to me.) A formulation that fulfils this requirement is: “It
is uncertain whether p, but I am not uncertain whether p (that is, I am absolutely certain
that p).”
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able will be, but her subjective Bayesian take on probabilities (including probability
1) implies that she cannot claim that there is any objective certainty as to what
the measurement outcome since she cannot countenance any “fact determining
what the real state is.”36 Sentences of the form of the QBMP seem pragmatically
problematic since expressing absolute certainty seems irrational if one does not be-
lieve it to be grounded in facts. Timpson notes that similar-structured paradoxical
features of ascriptions of probability 1 are generic in accounts that are based on
the subjective Bayesian take on probability and arise not only in the context of
quantum Bayesianism. However, whereas subjective Bayesians in other contexts
are in principle free to simply refrain from making assignments of probability 1,
quantum Bayesians must make them unless they abandon the assignment of pure
states. As Timpson notes, “the occurrence of these paradoxical sentences isn’t just
an occasional oddity which can be ignored” but one which “arises whenever one
finds a quantum Bayesian who is happy to assign pure states and is also explicit
about what their understanding of the quantum state is.”37
As Timpson points out, quantum Bayesians may react to this problem by ad-
opting a perspective on pure states that is similar to that of ethical non-cognitivism
with respect to moral discourse. In analogy to how non-cognitivists may aspire to
explain why endorsing moral claims is legitimate in the absence of moral facts,
quantum Bayesians might “elaborate on how there can be a role for personal cer-
tainty within our intellectual economy which is insulated against the absence of any
impersonal certainty.”38 Whatever the prospects of this defence, the main problem
remains that it is unclear how being certain can be rational if at the same time one
denies that there are any facts on which one’s certainty might be grounded.
To decide whether the Rule Perspective is committed to the systematic en-
dorsement of QBMP sentences just as much as quantum Bayesianism, we have to
recall that the crux of Timpson’s derivation of the QBMP in quantum Bayesian-
ism is his paraphrase of “I ascribe probability 1 to ‘p’ ” with “I am certain that
p”. This identification makes sense in the quantum Bayesian context inasmuch as
this position construes quantum states as “states of knowledge rather than states of
nature”39 and interprets quantum probabilities as subjective degrees of belief. On a
plausible reading of this claim, adopted by Timpson, quantum probabilities repres-
ent the assigning agents’ degrees of beliefs, not any properties of physical objects.
On this reading, the probabilities derived from the quantum state assigned by an
agent should always match this agent’s degrees of belief about possible outcomes,
for this condition must be met by the state to merit the title of her actual “state of
belief”. Timpson paraphrase of “I ascribe probability 1 to ‘p”’ with “I am certain
that p” relies on a reading of the quantum Bayesians’ claim that quantum states
are “states of belief” along precisely these lines.
The Rule Perspective evades the quantum Bayesian Moore’s paradox by denying
that quantum states are to be conceived as “states of belief” in the first place. On
this view, in accordance with Healey’s pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory,
the role of quantum states is, first, to licence application of the Born Rule to some
non-quantum claims and, second, to actually compute the Born Rule probabilities
for these claims. Probabilities derived from the Born Rule need not correspond to
36Ibid. p. 605.
37Ibid. p. 605.
38Ibid. p. 606.
39See [Caves et al. 2002b] p. 4537.
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our actual degrees of belief (inasmuch as these are defined at all), even though we
employ them when forming our beliefs as to what values the observables we are
concerned with are likely to have. As an epistemic account of quantum states the
Rule Perspective holds that what state an agent should assign depends on her epi-
stemic situation, but this isn’t the same as construing the state (or the probabilities
derived from it) as coinciding with the agent’s actual degrees of beliefs. Quantum
state assignments, on this view, are correct if performed in accordance with the
rules of state assignment, independently of whether the probabilities derived from
the states really correspond to the agents’ degrees of belief.
The application of quantum theory in practice supports this view: The question
of whether or not the probabilities assigned to the possible values of observables
of some system precisely coincide with the degrees of belief of the agents carrying
out the experiment plays no role when judging whether their state assignments are
adequate. Saying this of course does not mean to deny that the states they assign
have ramifications for their beliefs about outcomes of their experiments.
To sum up, while the Rule Perspective construes quantum probabilities as
subjective (or at least non-objective) in one sense by allowing that probability
assignments may legitimately differ from agent to agent, it does not interpret
quantum probabilities as directly corresponding to the agents’ degrees of beliefs.
The quantum Bayesian translation of “I ascribe probability 1 to ‘p’ ” with “I am cer-
tain that p” is unacceptable for the Rule Perspective, and this blocks the derivation
of the quantum Bayesian Moore’s paradox.
5 Challenging anthropocentric notions
5.1 Bell’s criticism
Quantum Bayesianism and the Rule Perspective are formulated in terms of notions
such as “agent”, “epistemic situation” and “state assignment”, which are neither
themselves fundamental physical notions nor in any evident way reducible to such
notions. In the present section I discuss an objection against the employment of
such “anthropocentric notions” (as I will call them in what follows), which claims
that these notions are far too vague and too imprecise to be used in foundational
accounts.40
Let us first have a more precise look at the role of anthropocentric notions
in epistemic accounts of quantum states. The notion of an agent, to begin with,
is employed in the statement of the epistemic conception of quantum states itself,
claiming that quantum states reflect the assigning agents’ epistemic conditions with
respect to the system states are assigned to. This idea, evidently, cannot be ex-
pressed without relying on some notion of a subject having an epistemic condition
and assigning a quantum state. The notions “epistemic condition” and “state as-
signment” themselves are no less anthropocentric than “agent” (or “subject”), and
they appear equally irreducibly and ineliminably in the statement of the epistemic
conception of states itself. In addition, some relative of the notion of measurement
is employed in both quantum Bayesianism and the Rule Perspective: In the case
40See [Bell 1990] p. 209 for a list of anthropocentric notions frequently encountered in
formulations of quantum mechanics which, according to Bell, are ill-suited for the purposes
of foundational debates.
19
of quantum Bayesianism the relevant notion is that of an “experimental interven-
tion[...] into nature”41, in the case of the Rule Perspective it is that of an event
resulting in “new knowledge” of the values of observables, to be taken into account
when updating one’s state assignment in accordance with Lu¨ders’ Rule. Different
epistemic accounts of quantum states use different anthropocentric notions, but in
view of the crucial role which anthropocentric notions play in the statement of the
epistemic conception of states itself and in the more detailed considerations of the
two versions discussed here it seems highly plausible that epistemic accounts of
quantum states cannot dispense with them altogether.
Interpretations of quantum theory that rely on anthropocentric notions are
heavily criticised by some of the most distinguished interpreters of the theory. J.
S. Bell, for instance, claims that such notions are not sufficiently sharp and fun-
damental to be used in foundational accounts of the theory. Among the words
which, according to him, “however legitimate and necessary in application, have
no place in a formulation with any pretension to physical precision”42 one finds,
for instance, “observable, information, measurement”, which, evidently, are close
relatives of the anthropocentric notions encountered in the epistemic accounts of
quantum states discussed here. Bell’s main complaint concerns the role of these no-
tions in accounts which postulate the occurrence of measurement collapse whenever
a quantum system is measured. Famously, Bell comments sarcastically on this idea:
What exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the role of ‘meas-
urer’? Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thou-
sands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared?
Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better qualified system
... with a PhD? If the theory is to apply to anything but highly ideal-
ised laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or
less ‘measurement-like’ processes are going on more or less all the time,
more or less everywhere? Do we not have jumping then all the time?
([Bell 1990] p. 209.)
Bell’s criticism of the textbook picture of measurement collapse as occurring when-
ever the system is measured seems very reasonable and intuitive. However, it does
not directly apply to the versions of the epistemic conception of quantum states
considered here. These deny that there is such a thing as the wavefunction of
a quantum system with respect to which the question of when it “jumps” can
be meaningfully asked. In particular, according to these accounts there exists no
such thing as a “wavefunction of the universe”, which at one point “jumps” for
the first time in its history. Primitive anthropocentric notions are indeed used in
the accounts considered here, but their role is not that of specifying under which
conditions which physical process takes place but to characterise, on a conceptual
level, the elements of the formalism of quantum theory as employed by competent
physicists.
The difference between these two different kinds of appeal to anthropocentric
notions is clarified by Fuchs in his quantum Bayesian characterisation of quantum
theory as a “users’ manual that any agent can pick up and use to help make wiser
decisions in this world of inherent uncertainty.”43 In this picture of quantum theory,
41See [Fuchs 2002] p. 7 and various other places.
42See [Bell 1990] p. 209. The emphasis is Bell’s.
43See [Fuchs 2010] p. 8.
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the theory is construed as an empirical extension of subjective Bayesian probability
theory, where probability theory, in turn, is construed as an “extension of logic”.44
Fuchs convincingly argues that on this conception quantum Bayesianism cannot
be asked to deliver a reductive analysis of notions such as “agent” any more than
philosophers of logic can be asked to deliver a reductive account of notions such
as “logical subject” (that is, the notion of an agent employing of the methods of
logic):
[I]s ... quantum mechanics ... obligated to derive the notion of agent
for whose aid the theory was built in the first place? The answer
comes from turning the tables: Thinking of probability theory in the
personalist Bayesian way, as an extension of formal logic, would one
ever imagine that the notion of an agent, the user of the theory, could
be derived out of its conceptual apparatus? Clearly not. How could you
possibly get flesh and bones out of a calculus for making wise decisions?
The logician and the logic he uses are two different substances—they
live in conceptual categories worlds apart. One is in the stuff of the
physical world, and one is somewhere nearer to Plato’s heaven of ideal
forms. Look as one might in a probability textbook for the ingredients
to reconstruct the reader himself, one will never find them. So too, the
Quantum Bayesian says of quantum theory. ([Fuchs 2010] p. 8 f.)
Fuchs’ point is that if quantum theory is conceived of as normative, namely, as a
“manual” to “make wiser decisions”, one can hardly expect that the notion of an
agent applying the methods of that manual might be spelled out in terms of the
manual’s own notions. Thus, Bell’s criticism of the employment of anthropocentric
notions in interpretations of quantum theory does not seem to apply to the epi-
stemic accounts of quantum states considered here due to how they rely on such
notions. Fuchs’ comparison between quantum theory and logic might be criticised
on grounds that quantum theory, unlike logic, is a physical theory and that agents
using quantum theory and the world they live in are themselves (aggregates of)
objects studied in physics, whereas agents availing themselves of the methods of
logic and the world they live in are not (aggregates of) objects studied in logic
(whatever exactly one takes these to be). The crucial point of Fuchs’ argument,
however, is that in quantum Bayesianism anthropocentric notions are employed
at the meta-level of characterising the status of quantum theoretical concepts—
claiming that quantum states are used non-descriptively, for instance—not at the
object-level of describing physical processes themselves—such as physical collapse
and under which conditions it occurs. The textbook accounts criticised by Bell, in
contrast, make object-level use of anthropocentric notions in that they conceive of
measurement collapse as a physical process that takes place whenever the system
is measured.
To sum up, Bell’s verdict against anthropocentric notions in foundational ac-
counts seems reasonable only with respect to accounts which invoke these notions
at the object-level of physical processes. There is no reason to extend it to ac-
counts which use anthropocentric notions to clarify the status and linguistic role
of the elements of the quantum theoretical formalism. Inasmuch as this is what
quantum Bayesianism and the Rule Perspective do, they are not concerned by Bell’s
criticism. The following subsection investigates whether the restriction of appeal
44See [Fuchs 2010] fn. 14 on p. 8.
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to anthropocentric notions to the meta-level of conceptual clarification can coher-
ently be upheld in view of challenges related to the determinateness of values of
observables.
5.2 Anthropocentric notions and value determinateness
In debates about the foundations of quantum theory it is often claimed that appeal
to “measurement” should not be understood as entailing the existence of a value of
the quantity taken to be “measured” prior to the measurement act. The idea that
in the context of quantum theory “measurement” should be construed as denoting
an act of creation of something thereby brought into existence rather than an act of
establishing the existence of something already there has a long tradition. Pascual
Jordan, for instance, implicitly endorses such a notion of measurement when he
writes that it is “we ourselves [who] bring about the matters of fact”45 which we
usually think of as being determined in experiments. Similar ideas can be found
in the writings of adherents of the epistemic conception of quantum states, for
instance in those of the quantum Bayesians Fuchs and Schack, who claim that the
“measured values” of observables are not merely “ ‘read off’ ” in measurement but
rather “enact[ed] or creat[ed] ... by the [measurement] process itself.”46
Quantum Bayesianism’s main motivation for denying the existence of determ-
inate values prior to measurement is the conflict between assuming such values
and the famous no-go theorems on determinate value assignments originating from
Gleason, Bell, Kochen and Specker. As explained in Section 3.1, quantum Bayesian-
ism denies that we can ever know which observable some numerical value obtained
in an experiment is a value of, but it doesn’t go as far as claiming that observ-
ables do not have any values at all. Given this assumption, quantum Bayesianism
is drawn to the conclusion that determinate values are created only in the act of
measurement itself. In the words of Fuchs:
QBism [i. e., quantum Bayesianism fleshed out by Fuchs] says when an
agent reaches out and touches a quantum system—when he performs
a quantum measurement—that process gives rise to birth in a nearly
literal sense. With the action of the agent upon the system, the no-go
theorems of Bell and Kochen-Specker assert that something new comes
into the world that wasn’t there previously: It is the “outcome,” the
unpredictable consequence for the very agent who took the action.
([Fuchs 2010] p. 8.)
And a few pages later:
That the world should violate Bell’s theorem remains, even for QBism,
the deepest statement ever drawn from quantum theory. It says that
quantum measurements are moments of creation. ([Fuchs 2010] p.
14)47
The problem with the construal of “quantum measurement” as a type of “birth”
or “creation” as advocated by the quantum Bayesians is that this move seems to
45See [Jordan 1934] p. 228, my translation.
46See [Fuchs and Schack 2011] p. 3.
47See the rest of Section V of [Fuchs 2010] for a detailed argument using Bell-Kochen-
Specker-type reasoning for the view that measurements bring about the values of observ-
ables determined through them.
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lead straightforwardly to an application of “measurement” in what according to
the terminology used in the previous subsection counts as an object-level type of
way. In this case, it is not the occurrence of collapse as a physical process which
is taken to occur when a measurement is performed, but the “birth” of the value
of an observable when it is measured. According to these considerations, it seems
that quantum Bayesianism is unable to confine its employment of anthropocentric
notions to the meta-level of conceptual clarification alone, in which case Bell’s
criticism applies after all.
From a general perspective, the challenge of accounting for determinate post-
measurement values without relying on object-level anthropocentric notions can be
construed as a re-appearance of the measurement problem in disguise: As explained
in Section 2.1, the original measurement problem is dissolved in epistemic (or, more
generally, non-ontic) accounts of quantum states by rejecting the notion of the
quantum state a quantum system is in, but the question as to why measurement
processes, as a matter of fact, do always result in determinate outcomes remains
unaddressed. It is tempting to read the passages of the quantum Bayesians on
“quantum measurement” as a type of “birth” or “creation” as a response to this
challenge that invokes primitive anthropocentric notions at the object-level. In that
case, however, it would still be concerned by Bell’s criticism and its dissolution of
the measurement problem could not be considered successful.
To defend themselves against this charge, quantum Bayesians may point out
that to conceive of measurement as an act of “birth” of the value of an observable
is not the same as using “measurement” to define under which conditions determ-
inate values are assumed. Indeed, in their writings quantum Bayesians never try
to use “measurement” (or a related notion) to define a criterion of under which
conditions which observables have determinate values. Rather, as Fuchs claims,
“for the QBist, the real world ... —with its objects and events—is taken for gran-
ted”48, which one may take to be saying that quantum Bayesianism presupposes
the existence of “events” in which the values of observables become determinate
as a primitive fact without any need of a further grounding. They might add that
among these events are the “measurement events”—which are those which we use
to obtain information as to what the values of observables really are. Phrased dif-
ferently (and perhaps somewhat crudely): Observables do not assume determinate
values because some process is a measurement process (an idea analogous to the
one ridiculed by Bell), but we call certain processes measurement processes because
the values of observables taken to be “measured” are determinate at their end (in
such a way that we can obtain information about them). The quantum Bayesian
account of “measurement” as an act of “birth” thus does not necessarily lead to
the employment of anthropocentric notions at the object-level.
What quantum Bayesianism does not account for, however, is how physicists
can be so confident as they manifestly are as regards in which setup the values
of which observables come out determinate. The Rule Perspective is in a better
position than quantum Bayesianism in this respect in that it construes quantum
theory as entailing that determinate values of the observables meant to be measured
are precisely what competent users of quantum theory should expect. To see this,
we have to recall some elements of the discussion of what quantum probabilities
are probabilities of in the Rule Perspective.
Here we may schematically think of a measurement setup as a two-part system,
48See [Fuchs 2010] p. 7.
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which consists of a “measured system” S1 on the one hand and a “measurement
apparatus” S2 on the other, such that information about the value of the “measured
observable” A (pertaining to the measured system) can be gained from taking in the
value of the “pointer” observable X (pertaining to the apparatus and discriminating
between different display configurations). Now, what it takes for a system to qualify
as a candidate “measurement setup” is that effects from environmental decoherence,
when they are taken into account, will render the density matrix assigned to the
combined system S1∪S2 approximately diagonal in an eigenbasis of A⊗X. As the
Rule Perspective claims (following Healey, see Section 3.2.2), quantum theory in
this case “licenses” (Healey’s wording) various NQMCs which state that the values
of A and X lie in ranges ∆A and ∆X of possible values the observables A and X
might assume. From the point of view of the Rule Perspective, to treat a NQMC
of the form “The value of A lies in ∆A” as “licensed” by quantum theory means
to proceed by assuming that the value of A either determinately lies within ∆A or
determinately outside ∆A. Quantum theory thus gives the agent an entitlement to
treat the values of both the “measured” and the “pointer” observable as determinate
(at least within bounds as determined by decoherence), so insisting that these
observables do not have determinate values (whatever this would practically mean)
would mean failing to apply the theory correctly.
The Rule Perspective, to sum up, not only dissolves the measurement problem
by undermining its formulation in terms of quantum states quantum systems “are
in” but allows the further claim that outcome determinateness in measurement
contexts is precisely what competent users of the theory are entitled to assume.
If an experimental setup is supposed to measure the value of an observable A of
some system but is such that taking into account decoherence effects does not give
agents an entitlement to treat the value of A as determinate, the setup simply
does not qualify as a candidate “measurement setup” for A. Making sure that the
setup qualifies as a “measurement setup” for A, in other words, is the same as
making sure that one has an entitlement to assume that the value of A is going to
be determinate in it. Without appealing to primitive anthropocentric notions at
the object-level, this accounts for why outcome determinateness is something that
physicists can be taken for granted in practice.
6 Challenging explanation without ontic quantum
states
6.1 The micro/macro divide
One of the core elements of the epistemic conception of quantum states is that it
conceives of quantum states as non-descriptive. In this section, I consider the cri-
ticism that any non-descriptive reading of quantum states entails an unattractive
ontological quantum/classical divide, separating a realm of classical macro-objects
the properties of which are susceptible to descriptions from a realm of quantum
micro-objects the properties of which are not. The claim that an ontological divide
of this kind comes hand in hand with an epistemic account of quantum states is
made with respect to quantum Bayesianism by Timpson, who does not regard it as
giving rise to an insuperable challenge to quantum Bayesianism, however. The on-
tological framework which, according to him, goes best with quantum Bayesianism
comprises, on the one hand, a “micro-level we have dubbed unspeakable to which
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we are denied direct descriptive access”49 and, on the other hand, a “macroscopic
or classical level [which] will be a level of objects which do have unproblematically
stateable truths about them.”50 Such a two-part ontological framework is confron-
ted with obvious difficulties such as that of making sense of a world that comprises
to such utterly different levels of reality in the first place as well as that of specifying
where the line between the levels should be drawn. Drawing on ideas from Nancy
Cartwright’s philosophy of science, Timpson suggests that it can be made coher-
ent if one admits at the macro-level “metaphysically emergent properties [which] a
composite can possess but which its components cannot[,] and which are not con-
ferred on it by the properties possessed by its components and the laws (if any)
which they obey.”51 As he seems to suggest, accepting such properties and their
anti-reductionist ramifications is the price to be paid for a non-descriptive reading
of quantum states.
Despite the unorthodox character of the two-level ontology which he sketches
Timpson claims that “[i]f called upon, ... the quantum Bayesian seems able to
present an intelligible ontology to underlie their position.”52 Others are more scep-
tical as regards the intelligibility of a two-level ontology comprising a level of objects
that admit a descriptive account and a level of objects which don’t. Marchildon, for
instance, regards the empirically manifest fact that macroscopic objects “are always
in definite states”53 as difficult to account for by epistemic accounts of quantum
states. According to him, these have to choose between the three equally unat-
tractive claims that either microscopic quantum objects “do not exist”, that they
“may exist, but have no states” or that they “may exist and may have states, but
attempts at narrowing down their existence or specifying their states are useless,
confusing, or methodologically inappropriate.”54 As he sees it, all these options
are implausible, given that the “unspeakable” (Timpson’s expression) microscopic
objects are the (mereological) constituents of the macroscopic objects for which
unproblematic “definite states” do exist. In response to this criticisms the option
of resorting to a two-level ontology based on metaphysically emergent properties
may come to the rescue for the quantum Bayesian, but the challenge of combining
a macro-level of describable “classical” objects and a micro-level of “unspeakable”
quantum objects in a coherent metaphysical framework remains formidable never-
theless. However, as I shall argue now, the example of the Rule Perspective shows
that a two-level ontology of this kind is not necessarily part of an epistemic account
of quantum states.
To see this, it is useful to recall that the contrast between the descriptive
character of NQMCs and the non-descriptive character of quantum states refers to a
difference in the linguistic roles of the statements, not to a contrast between distinct
realms of objects they are about. Quantum states can legitimately (and with much
theoretical gain) be assigned to objects of arbitrarily large “macroscopic” size, for
instance by using the many-particle methods of quantum statistical mechanics,
so their application is not confined to the micro-regime. At the same time, the
most “microscopic” quantum objects elementary particle physicists have discovered
49See [Timpson 2008] p. 597.
50Ibid. p. 598.
51Ibid. p. 599.
52Ibid. p. 600.
53See [Marchildon 2004] p. 1462.
54Ibid. p. 1462.
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(quarks, leptons, and gauge bosons may be named) can very well be described in
terms of NQMCs—with the caveat that not all NQMCs are licensed at all times—
just as much as the largest objects of cosmology. There is even a close interplay
between the application of NQMCs and the assignment of quantum states to one
and the same quantum system: Agents assign a quantum state on the basis of their
epistemic relation to the system—that is, on the basis of what NQMCs they know
to be true of the system—, and the “licensing” of further NQMCs depends on the
features of the quantum states they assign. The distinction between quantum states
and non-quantum claims, on this view, corresponds to a difference in linguistic roles
and tasks, not to a difference between different types of objects referred to.
As these considerations show, epistemic accounts of quantum states need not
commit themselves to an ontological micro/macro divide. The Rule Perspective,
in particular, does not lead to a two-level ontology where a “classical” macro-level
contrasts with an “unspeakable” quantum micro-level. Furthermore, as I shall argue
in what follows, from this perspective there is no particular problem in non-ontic
accounts of quantum states to account for reductive explanation of macro-properties
in terms of the behaviour of micro-objects.
6.2 Explanation without ontic quantum states
Quantum theory is perhaps the theory with the greatest explanatory success in the
history of science, and any interpretation of it that is incapable of accounting for this
success has serious shortcomings. The final objection against epistemic accounts of
quantum states to be discussed here is that non-descriptive readings of quantum
states (not involving hidden variables) are in general incompatible with quantum
theory’s incontestable explanatory force. Timpson has explicitly raised this charge
against quantum Bayesianism by (rhetorically) asking “if quantum mechanics is not
to be construed as a theory which involves ascribing properties to micro-objects
along with laws describing how they behave, can we account for [its] explanat-
ory strength?”55 According to Timpson, the quantum Bayesian interpretation
of quantum states as “states of belief” entails that all that can possibly be ac-
counted for by means of quantum theoretical reasoning involving quantum states
are agents’ beliefs and expectations, not physical phenomena themselves. As an
example, Timpson considers the explanation provided by quantum many-particle
theory as to why some solid materials (sodium, in his example) conduct electricity
well, whereas others don’t, and remarks that “[u]ltimately we are just not interested
in agents’ expectation that matter structured like sodium would conduct; we are
interested in why in fact it does so.”56 Quantum theory, as Timpson emphasises,
helps us explain the behaviour of physical systems only because its vocabulary refers
to these systems themselves, not to the scientists and their expectations and beliefs
about them. Any interpretation of quantum theory that attempts to account for
its explanatory force must respect this.
There is a natural response by means of which quantum Bayesians may at-
tempt to address this challenge. It starts with the observation that on the quantum
Bayesian account of the quantum theoretical formalism as a “manual ... to help
make wiser decisions”57 the theory does not say anything about what agents actu-
55See [Timpson 2008] p. 600.
56Ibid. p. 600.
57See [Fuchs 2010] p. 8.
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ally do believe, but rather about what they should believe in which circumstances
to maximise their predictive success. On this reading, quantum theory does not so
much describe our expectations and beliefs but rather prescribes what we should
expect and believe under which conditions. At this point, one may ask why the
reasoning which leads to the expectation that some physical phenomenon or regu-
larity should occur cannot count as a candidate quantum theoretical explanation
of precisely that phenomenon or regularity, contrary to what Timpson suggests.
Unfortunately, this question leads directly into the troubled waters of the long-
standing debate in the philosophy of science concerning the general relation between
explanation and prediction, which is far too involved to be entered in the context
of the present investigation. To keep matters simple, however, we can proceed by
assuming that the quantum Bayesian—or the proponent of any other epistemic
account of quantum states facing the same challenge—may simply regard it as a
ramification of her view that to account for why some phenomenon or regularity is
to be expected when correctly applying quantum theory (and in that sense predict-
ing it quantum theoretically) is just what it means to explain that phenomenon or
regularity by means of quantum theory. In precisely this vein Healey bases his prag-
matist account of “how quantum theory helps us explain”58 on the idea that “[t]o
use a theory to explain a regularity involves showing the regularity is just what one
should expect in the circumstances, if one accepts that theory.”59 To apply this idea
to the example proposed by Timpson, consider an agent who competently applies
quantum many-particle theory in solid state theory and arrives at the expectation
that matter having the structure and composition of sodium should conduct elec-
tricity well. There seems to be no categorical reason of why her reasoning should
not qualify as a candidate quantum theoretical explanation of the phenomenon or
regularity at issue. In any case, the quantum theoretical reasoning used is not about
the agent’s expectation and beliefs, even though it certainly functions as a guide
for the agent when forming them. Quantum Bayesians may claim that in view of
these considerations they can account very well for quantum theory’s explanatory
force since they do not construe the theory as describing what agents actually do
belief and expect, but, instead, what they should belief and expect.
Unfortunately, however, this response is not open to them, and the main reason
for why not is again their rejection of the notion of a state assignment being per-
formed correctly. According to this rejection, it does not make sense to ask whether
some quantum theoretical reasoning that involves the assignment of quantum states
is correct or incorrect, so, according to this view, quantum theory does not actually
have the prescriptive bite which the line of defence just considered assumes that it
has. Moreover, for any supposed quantum theoretical explanation the question of
whether it correctly explains what it is meant to explain cannot be meaningfully
asked on this view, and this shows that quantum Bayesianism cannot account for
the distinction between failed and successful explanations by quantum theory. Since
it is difficult to see how one might account for the notion of a quantum theoretical
explanation without being able to make sense of the distinction between failed and
successful quantum theoretical explanations, Timpson’s charge applies to quantum
Bayesianism after all in that it cannot account for the tremendous explanatory force
which the theory undoubtedly has.
The Rule Perspective, in contrast to quantum Bayesianism, acknowledges from
58See the title of [Healey forthcoming b].
59See [Healey forthcoming b] p. 6, emphasis mine.
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the start that the question of correctness does apply to quantum theoretical reas-
oning resulting in expectations about physical phenomena and regularities and in
that sense has much better resources to account for the notion of a quantum the-
oretical explanation. In accordance with Healey’s account of quantum theoretical
explanation as formulated in [Healey forthcoming b], it emphasises the importance
of NQMCs to describe both the phenomena and regularities for which quantum the-
oretical explanations are sought (the explananda) and the assumptions and back-
ground conditions on which the supposed explanations are based (the explanan-
tia). In the example of explaining the experimentally determined conductivities
of solid materials, the explanantia include descriptions of the internal composition
and structure of the materials at issue together with the external conditions the
materials are subjected to. Given these “known facts” of the systems at issue,
the rules of state assignment dictate which quantum states to assign (even though
approximations may have to be made due to insuperable difficulties involved in
computing these states exactly). The Born Rule, in addition, permits to derive
the probabilities which are to be attributed to the possible values of observables
on the basis of these states.60 So, according to the Rule Perspective, a physical
phenomenon or regularity can be explained successfully by quantum theory just
in case the phenomenon or the regularity is precisely what agents forming their
expectations on the basis of these probabilities would expect.
To sum up, in contrast with quantum Bayesianism the Rule Perspective can ac-
count very well for the distinction between failure and success of supposed quantum
theoretical explanations. Furthermore, as argued in the previous subsection, the
Rule Perspective is not committed to an ontological micro/macro divide and is
therefore no less compatible with reductionist accounts of quantum explanation
than the most-discussed ontic accounts of quantum states. This has the interesting
further ramification that epistemic accounts of quantum states need not embrace
the explanatory anti-reductionism that is advocated by the quantum Bayesians.61
Defending a non-ontic account of quantum states is perfectly compatible with de-
fending strategies of explanatory reductionism in general philosophy of science.
7 Concluding Remark
The aim of this paper has been to make it plausible that the idea of a therapeutic ac-
count of quantum theory can be coherently articulated and defended in form of the
Rule Perspective. As already remarked, this rather modest aim differs substantially
from the much more ambitious one of showing that the Rule Perspective is superior
to all rival accounts of quantum theory—something that I do not at all intend to
suggest. Before closing this paper, I would like to acknowledge that accounts of the
therapeutic stripe characterised in Section 1 are not the only ones which attempt to
make sense of quantum theory without introducing additional technical vocabulary
60Quantum Bayesianism concurs that the Born Rule has the normative role of prescrib-
ing which probabilities to assign on the basis of which quantum states (see [Fuchs 2010] p.
8). It denies, however, that the theory has any normative force concerning which states are
to be assigned on the basis of which evidence. This denial creates the problems discussed
in the previous paragraph.
61See [Fuchs 2010] p. 21 fn. 31 for a quantum Bayesian endorsement of explanatory
anti-reductionism and [Timpson 2008] p. 592 and p. 600 for helpful remarks on the role
and importance of anti-reductionism in quantum Bayesianism.
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such as hidden variables or explicit dynamics of collapse. Similar things can be said
of adherents of the Everett interpretation, who regard it as the most striking virtue
of their interpretation that it does not attach any additional theoretical elements
to the original formalism of the theory. In the words of David Wallace:
If I were to pick one theme as central to the tangled development of
the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, it would probably be:
the formalism is to be left alone. What distinguished Everett’s original
paper both from the Dirac-von Neumann collapse-of-the-wavefunction
orthodoxy and from contemporary rivals such as the de Broglie-Bohm
theory was its insistence that unitary quantum mechanics need not
be supplemented in any way (whether by hidden variables, by new
dynamical processes, or whatever). (See [Wallace 2007] p. 311.)
The idea of “leaving the formalism alone”, however, is much less straightforward
than Wallace suggests. Taken by itself, the formalism is just an uninterpreted piece
of mathematics, which then derives its extra-mathematical significance from its ap-
plication by competent physicists in quantum theoretical practice. Wallace’s case
for the Everett interpretation as the single outstanding take on quantum theory
which does not “supplement” the formalism “in any way” is valid only if one pre-
supposes that the role of quantum states is to describe the physical facts. Making
this assumption is a natural first step when interpreting the theory, and to outline
its implications is both highly important and rewarding, as the work of Everettians
impressively demonstrates. For those impressed by the problems encountered by
Everettians when trying to “leave alone” the formalism while giving it a descriptive
reading62 a natural next step is to look for alternatives which also “leave alone”
the formalism but refrain from construing quantum states as descriptive. The aim
of the present paper has been to substantiate the claim that such an alternative is
indeed viable and that it has to be taken serious as an approach to the foundations
of quantum theory.
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